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GRATUITOUS UNDERTAKINGS AND
THE DUTY OF CARE
CHARLES 0. GREGORY
I
IRST year law students always have difficulty with the concept of
duty in the law of negligence. For that matter, their professors
do not find it easy and certainly have a hard time getting it across
intelligibly in class. Yet the expanding field of duty of care is the most
important part of our common law of torts. This facet of the common
law is experiencing profound changes under the impact of modern
developments in liability insurance and of analogous trends toward
placing on enterprises the losses occasioned by the risks they create.
No doubt it is a bit old fashioned to talk about liability for negligence
in terms of duty and cause. But it seems necessary in order to give be-
ginning students something to hold onto as a framework for the confu-
sion now constituting our law of negligence. Hence, at the risk of being
pedantic, I am going to indulge in some elementary observations before
embarking on a discussion of duty of care in the actual doing of things
which there is no obligation to do at all, in the first place.
Negligence occurs not only by doing things in a sub-standard fash-
ion. It also occurs by failing to do certain things under circumstances
indicating that such failure is likely to prove harmful to others. I hate
to suggest the old distinction between misfeasance (doing something
the wrong way) and nonfeasance (not doing anything at all). But after
using the more accurate circumlocutions, these terms seem refreshingly
convenient. To illustrate what they mean, driving an automobile care-
lessly is misfeasance. So is tossing a bottle out of a window into the
street. And so is anything in the way of active conduct which foresee-
ably creates a risk of harm towards others. Nonfeasance, on the other
hand, occurs when anybody breaks a promise by failing or refusing to
do something which he has said he would do. It also occurs when one
refuses to go to the help of another, even though his granting assistance
is the only way of preventing harm to the other person. And it occurs
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when the owner of land or a chattel fails to make an inspection of his
property to discover latent defects which subsequently cause harm to
others. Unfortunately the distinction between misfeasance and non-
feasance-however clear it may be conceptually-sometimes becomes
blurred in actuality. For it is occasionally difficult to say whether be-
havior attributed to a defendant is action or non-action; and sometimes
non-action occurs in such a way and at such a time as to make it appear
a part of a preceding and closely connected course of active conduct.
In any event, however negligence may occur, it is well established
that it does not always entail liability, even when damage ensues. Before
the negligent defendant can be held liable, the court must be con-
vinced that he was under a duty of care, that his negligence was a
breach of such duty, and that it was what is euphemistically called the
proximate cause of the damage sustained by the plaintiff.
This is not the time or place to try to explain what negligence is or to
describe in detail the nature of the simple negligence issue. Nor is it
appropriate here to discuss the complicated meanings which have been
read into the term "proximate cause." In passing, however, it seems
proper to suggest that whatever else the proximate cause formula has
served to denote, it has nothing to do with the concept of duty. Too
often it has been stated that the famous Palsgraf' case was concerned
with the notion of duty and that Cardozo had concluded that Mrs. Pals-
graf could not get to the jury because there was no duty of care toward
her. I think that notion is quite false, since the railroad obviously owed
her a duty of care because she was a ticket-holder on the station plat-
form. Cardozo concluded only that there had not been a breach of this
duty because the defendant's servants had not been negligent toward
her. His conclusion was based on the fact that the evidence showed no
conduct on their part foreseeably endangering her person in any way.
And Andrews' dissent that it did in fact cause her harm has no bearing
at all on the matter of duty.
The concept "duty" is really a term of art in the law of negligence.
Its existence implies that relationship between the parties which re-
quires the exercise of care by the one toward the other. This relation-
ship manifests itself in all sorts of ways-sometimes by circumstances
which are most informal and at other times by circumstances which are
highly formal. What these circumstances were yesterday may not be
what they are today; and who can say what they will be tomorrow?
But the most ordinary and casual instances of duty to take care are per-
I Palsgraf v, The Long Island Railroad Co., ,48 N.Y. 339, 16z N.E. 99 (98).
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ceived in the everyday conduct of human beings acting and moving
about in physical juxtaposition to each other. They are free to engage
in normal activity; but if they are doing so where others have a right to
be, then they must act prudently with a view of avoiding harm to such
others. On tile other hand, if they are actively creating risks on their
own land, an entirely different set of considerations affect the deter-
mination of duty to be careful.
Perhaps it is unnecessary to emphasize the formal importance of
duty or no-duty in negligence litigation; but it will do no harm to recall
it at this time. Tile duty issue gives the court a powerful control over
the handling of negligence actions before a jury. For even if the evi-
dence clearly indicates negligence on the part of the defendant, the
court may still keep the case from the jury and direct a verdict for the
defendant if it concludes, as a matter of law, that there was no duty on
the defendant's part to exercise care. Thus, it is for the court alone to
determine when a jury may speculate on whether or not a defendant
has been guilty of actionable deviation from the standards of due care.
In view of the generally acknowledged vagaries of laymen sitting on
juries, this is an important element of control in keeping the common
law consistent. There are some who believe that such power in the
courts too severely restricts the imposition of liability. Others, how-
ever, are convinced that it keeps the law within reasonable bounds,
since it enables the courts to spell out the rules of the game in a wisely
conservative fashion and to expand the scope of liability step by step
only in accordance with the actual needs of a changing society.
The hardest problems in the field of duty grow out of inaction or the
failure to do that which, if it had been done, would have prevented the
harm complained of-in short, nonfeasance. As a rule, when a failure to
do something causes damage to another and is at the same time a breach
of contract, then the harmed promisee may maintain an action based on
negligence. This is an action in tort; and the duty of care finds its
source in the contract between the parties. Indeed, contract is perhaps
the strongest and most reliable genesis of duty that can be found in
the common law.
Much of our common law of torts is now devoted to the recognition
of a duty of care from one who is a party to a contract toward another
who is not a party to that contract. So deeply imbedded in our culture
was the belief that contract gave rise to duty, that our common-law
courts at first clung to the notion that every contract also delimited the
duty strictly to the contracting parties. Thus, in spite of the fact that
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one who prokided a chattel for another knew that his failure to discover
and correct defects would endanger third parties, he was nevertheless
held immune from liability to such persons and was made answerable
only to him for whom he had provided the chattel-all because of the
presence of privity of contract with the former and because of lack of
such privity with the latter.2
As our law has developed, of course, forseeability of harm to such
third parties has become a tremendously important item in the recog-
nition of duty of care toward them. In this process, however, the equal
importance of the original contract relationship has not been neglected.
For it has served to take the original transaction out of the field of
gratuitous undertakings and has placed it, rather, in the area of under-
takings for profit and gain.3 Through devices like contracts for the
benefit of third persons or, more simply, just because of plain everyday
foreseeability of harm to third persons, the courts have transcended the
notion that contract any longer serves to delimit duty to the contract-
ing parties alone. As to such third parties, arguably, the transaction may
still appear to be a gratuitous one; but the original contract indicates
that, as far as the negligent provider is concerned, he got something
from somebody and should not be classed simply as one who has merely
been granting favors for nothing in return.
II
It is impossible in one brief essay to discuss all aspects of the duty
issue in negligence litigation or even to broach all aspects of duty in
connection with nonfeasance or failure to act. I intend, therefore, to
confine my further remarks to a special conceptual development of
duty-that is, to situations where there is originally no duty to do any-
thing at all but where the alleged tortfeasor nevertheless embarks upon
a course of action gratuitously and involves somebody else in damages.
A good starting point is the grand old case of Coggs v. Bernard.4
There the defendant gratuitously undertook to move some casks of
brandy for the plaintiff from here to there, and in so doing he mis-
2 Winterbottom v. Wright, 1o M. & W. io9 (1842). For the American version of
this notion, see Huset v. J. L. Case Threshing Machine Co., i2o Fed. 865 (C. A. 8th,
1903).
3 See Cardozo, J., in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1o5o
(1916), where he cites Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274 (1866), the leading case
on the duty of a landowner to business visitors-i.e., the pecuniary benefit theory-
as an analogy to the manufacturer's duty toward the ultimate consumer.
4 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9 (1703). This case will be mentioned so often throughout this
article that its citation will not be repeated.
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handled and dropped one of the casks so that it broke, to the plaintiff's
damage. The court made it quite clear that if the defendant, after hav-
ing gratuitously promised to move the brandy, had failed altogether to
do so, the plaintiff could not have held him accountable for any damage
he suffered thereby. The reason was that the defendant's neglect would
have been a mere breach of promise-nonfeasance-not amounting to a
breach of contract because the promise was unsupported by considera-
tion. It would not do to allow a tort action here, in spite of the fact
that defendant's failure to fulfill his promise was a neglect amounting
to negligence, because that would circumvent the whole law of con-
tracts. Consideration being absent, there was therefore no duty to act.
And if there were no duty to perform, then neglect or nonfeasance
resulting in harm should not be regarded as actionable.
This feeling on the part of the early common-law judges was funda-
mental indeed. In the absence of positive law, such as a statute requir-
ing a certain course of conduct, or of some special relationship, includ-
ing contract, nothing in our culture could be deemed to impose an
obligation on anyone to do anything for anybody. Each man could
with impunity refuse to aid, or deal in any way with, his fellow man.
Of course, if he contracted to do certain things for another, his failure
to embark upon the performance of his promise would make him liable
for a breach of contract. In this sense alone was pure nonfeasance ac-
tionable at all. On the other hand, if he did embark upon a compliance-
say, the furnishing of a chattel-but wholly neglected to make a proper
inspection and to remedy a defect which shortly resulted in damage to
the person of his customer, then his negligence in the nature of non-
feasance became actionable as a tort. Curiously enough, while such a
neglect is accurately called a nonfeasance, it is apparent that it is not the
same kind of pure nonfeasance which is involved in the case of com-
pletely ignoring the contract to deliver. Already, then, we find our-
selves hedging on the concept of nonfeasance as it was originally con-
templated. In this latter situation, it means simply the failure to perform
some particular act under circumstances which required the doing of
that act if the basic duty underlying the whole transaction was to be
observed. Certainly the distinction just made is important, since it sug-
gests the difference between actions ex contractu and ex delictu.
But let us consider a completely unrelated situation. Suppose D hap-
pens along and sees a stranger lying on the sidewalk in great distress.
Now D can render assistance to this man and thus obviate ultimate
great harm to him. We may even suppose that if D does not help him,
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such harm is inevitable. Nevertheless, D refuses to render any assistance
and goes his way. Here, then, the stranger sustains damage which, but
for D's neglect, would not have occurred. May we therefore conclude
that D's neglect caused the stranger's ultimate avoidable damage?
While such a conclusion would be rash, indeed, under the circum-
stances here related, it would not seem queer at all if D were the head
of a boys' camp and the "stranger in distress" were one of his charges.
We are told, however, that D is under a moral obligation to render
assistance to the stranger in distress-one of those duties of imperfect
obligation which are left to the consciences of individuals. But the
common law takes no cognizance of such duties. Arguably the explana-
tion for this state of the law is the deep-seated cultural conviction in
Anglo-American society that you cannot make people do what they
have no desire to do-you cannot make each man his brother's keeper.6
An equally good legal explanation may be that there is nothing to seize
upon as the basis of actionable tort because there is nothing but absolute
nonfeasance involved in the transaction. Naturally, if there were some
legal duty to render assistance, then this element of nonfeasance would
not stand in the way of liability. But this legal duty (if not imposed by
statute) must find its source in some relationship which is more or less
consensual in its origin-something self-imposed like contract, master
and servant or a family tie. It is noteworthy that a failure to comply
with a contract obligation to render assistance in such a case would
probably result in an action of tort and not just an action for breach of
contract. While disregard of a family duty to render assistance might
not give rise to any action at all, because of the close domestic relation-
ship, it would probaby be a violation of the criminal law.
It has occasionally been suggested that we should change our law to
require the rendering of aid to strangers;7 but such a development
smacks of collectivism and seems unsuited to our individualistic culture.
The closest approach to such a duty is in statutes requiring motorists to
aid people whom they have non-negligently been instrumental in hurt-
5 References to duties of imperfect obligation occur both in Pasley v. Freeman,
3 T.R. 51 (1789) and in Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (S. Ct., 1809). For the
above assertion in the text see Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97 (19o8) and
Duty to Aid One Not Imperiled by Defendant's Fault, 17 Notre Dame Lawyer 51
(194).
6 Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, in Studies in
the Law of Torts 291 (1926).
7 Ames, op. cit. supra note s, at i i et seq. See also Duty to Aid One Not Imperiled
by Defendant's Fault, 17 Notre Dame Lawyer 51 (194).
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ing.8 In the meantime, however, certain developments in the law of
contracts have gone far to impose a duty to act where formerly no
such duty would have been recognized.' While this development has
hardly gone so far as to create liability for non-performance of an
executory promise, such as that mentioned above in Coggs v. Bernard,
yet it seems to be approaching that extreme.
Take the old case of Thorne v. Deas.10 There the two plaintiffs
owned a half interest in a vessel, the defendant owning the other half.
One of the plaintiffs was captain of the vessel. As he was about to leave
the port of New York on a voyage, the plaintiff-captain suggested that
they step over to the underwriters and insure the vessel against loss at
sea. The defendant, however, told the plaintiffs to rest assured-that he
would take care of it immediately after the ship had sailed. Relying on
this promise, the plaintiff-captain sailed; and the other plaintiff, also
relying on this promise, refrained from doing anything about it himself.
When the vessel was shipwrecked, the plaintiffs brought suit for dam-
ages against the defendant because he had not had the boat insured.
Chancellor Kent declared that no action could be maintained for
breach of the defendant's promise because it was unsupported by con-
sideration and was, therefore, not a binding contract. This decision
seems more unjust to me than letting off a passerby who refuses to help
a stranger in distress. After all, the defendant had solemnly promised
that he would insure the vessel and thereby led the trusting plaintiffs
not to do it themselves, which they otherwise would have done. But
what could Chancellor Kent do, as he read the common law prece-
dents? Surely there was no contract in existence, but only a nudum
pactmn. Unless he was to change the most vital part of the law of con-
tracts, it appeared that he had to excuse the defendant for this non-
feasance. How about labelling the defendant's duplicity a tort and
allowing recovery under that heading? Although his behavior smacked
of deceit, he had made no misrepresentation of a present existing fact
but only a bare promise as to future conduct. And Kent's contempo-
raries were not friendly to the notion of a later time that the defendant
might have been held on proof that when he made the promise, he did
not intend to fulfill it and was thus misrepresenting a present existing
fact-the state of his mind."
8 E.g., Ala. Code (1941) tit. 36, S 31; Deering's Calif. Vehicle Code (1948) § 482; Tex.
Penal Code (1925) art. i So; Va. Code Ann. (1950) tit. 46, § 46-189.
9 Rest., Contracts § 90 (1932). As to this, see i Williston, Contracts § 138 (rev. ed.,
1936).
104 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (S. Ct., 18o9).
11 See Gallager v. Brunel, 6 Cow. (N.Y.) 346 (S. Ct., t8a6).
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He could, of course, have concluded that the defendant's neglect to
take out insurance on the boat was negligence. The difficulty here,
however, was that even though the defendant was negligent in not
doing what he had promised to do, his neglect was simply nonfeasance.
Furthermore, there was no duty of care because, again, there was no
contract obliging him to do anything about carrying out his promise.
Defendant was admittedly a louse in almost every sense of the word;
but the only way to make him civilly accountable in tort would be to
find a duty to perform in a binding contract. As we shall presently see,
however, a later New York court felt that such a tour de force was not
so impossible as Chancellor Kent thought it was.'2
In the meantime, how about the defendant in Coggs v. Bernard who,
in gratuitously moving plaintiff's brandy, had broken one of the casks?
Although he was under no binding promise to perform, yet he was held
liable for the damage which occurred. But that was because he stuck
his neck out and actually entered upon the performance of his promise.
At that point he passed beyond the realm of nonfeasance into the area
of feasance-action or conduct-with specific physical reference to the
plaintiff's property which he had taken into his charge. Then, for the
first time, the judges had something to sit in judgment on without first
having to find a binding contract as a source of duty. Thus, they con-
cluded, the defendant did not have to undertake to fulfill his bare
gratuitous promise to move the casks; but once he had undertaken to
do so by assuming control of the casks and starting to perform, then
what he did he would have to do carefully. Here was the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance with a vengeance. For conduct
in relationship to the interests of others presumes duty, at least when
the plaintiff's interest involved is rightfully where it happened to be
when the defendant acted in relation to it.
This idea is very fundamental, indeed, and is older than the modem
law of negligence. Indeed, Chief Justice Holt referred to the defend-
ant's negligent handling of the casks as a sort of "deceipt.' 1 3 How far is
this basic idea to be carried? That depends, of course, on what you re-
gard as an undertaking or entering upon performance sufficient to car-
ry the defendant out of the realm of nonfeasance and into the area of
feasance. In Coggs v. Bernard there were two factors which con-
tributed to this transition. They were (i) the defendant's taking the
casks in charge-a bailment, and (z) his actually setting out with the
casks across the city in his cart. Must both of these factors, then, be
12 See Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 4 4 (1923).
18 In Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9 (1703).
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present to constitute feasance in the nature of an undertaking or enter-
ing upon, in order to give rise to a duty of care? It would not seem so,
as there are many actionable undertakings or enterings upon perform-
ance imaginable which have nothing to do with personal property. And
you can't have bailments without personal property. Hence, the second
factor of actually entering upon a course of conduct with respect to
the plaintiff's interest seems to be the essential criterion of duty in these
types of cases.
But what would be the significance of bailment alone, without mis-
conduct thereafter? Suppose that the defendant, having gratuitously
promised to move the casks, merely took them into his warehouse and
left them there indefinitely, to the great damage of plaintiff who had
counted on having them moved at a certain time. There is still no con-
tract, the whole matter as yet being merely a gratuitous undertaking.
Yet the defendant might seem to have gone beyond the state of non-
feasance by taking the casks into his possession. But the plaintiff's harm
occurred as a consequence of the defendant's failure to do anything
else-which certainly looks like nonfeasance. Defendant can say to
plaintiff: "All I did do was done well. The casks are still in my ware-
house, unharmed. Take them away any time you want to come for
them." Should the defendant be allowed to escape liability under the
circumstances on the ground that there was no duty of care, because
contract was absent and the only harm ensued from nonfeasance after
the bailment took place?
I don't know what Chief Justice Holt might have said about this;
but in our times the defendant might be held to a duty of care for the
results of such nonfeasance, once he had gone so far as to take posses-
sion of the plantiff's chattels. This is indicated by Carr v. Maine Central
Railroad.14 There plaintiff was overcharged for freight by defendant
railroad; but the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission pro-
hibited rebates of any sort without official consent. Defendant offered
gratuitously to secure an adjustment from the I.C.C.; and pursuant to
this arrangement, plaintiff handed over the necessary documents to the
defendant. The railroad thereafter neglected to do anything about the
matter within the six month's limitation period allowed, after which it
was too late to secure clearance for the rebate. Plaintiff's suit for the
amount of the overcharge was met with the defense that this was mere-
ly the breach of a gratuitous promise-a type of nonfeasance not action-
able in the absence of a binding contract. The New Hampshire Su-
14 78 N.H. 5oz, o, Ad. 532 (1917).
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preme Court, however, allowed recovery on a negligence theory, in-
ferring duty of care from the misfeasance implicit in the defendant's
having undertaken the task in the sense of entering upon its perform-
ance. This "course of conduct" had begun when the defendant took
the documents from the plaintiff, that being the first step in the na-
ture of performance. Naturally the defendant's real offense was non-
feasance after the bailment; but the court concluded that such neglect
was actually a negligent doing of what defendant had started to do with
relation to the plaintiff's interest. Moreover, it was impossible for the
plaintiff to have the matter taken care of when defendant alone had the
necessary documents.
Perhaps an even more intriguing case is Siegel v. Spear & Co. 5
There plaintiff had bought some furniture from defendant on the in-
stallment plan; and when the plaintiff planned to give up his apartment,
the defendant offered to warehouse the furniture for him gratuitously
during his absence. After this offer was made and accepted, but before
the bailment actually occurred, plaintiff told defendant that he would
get the furniture insured; but defendant told plaintiff to leave the mat-
ter to him, since he could do it more easily and cheaply. The bailment
itself was then made. The plaintiff relied on defendant's promise to in-
sure; but the defendant neglected to take out the insurance and the
warehouse was accidentally destroyed by fire a few weeks thereafter,
the furniture in question being a total loss. Plaintiff sued defendant for
the value of the furniture and was met with the defense that the
promise to insure was gratuitous, unsupported by consideration, and
with the argument that the neglect, being merely a nonfeasance, was
not actionable since there was no duty to perform. The New York
Court of Appeals, however, allowed the plaintiff to recover; but its
theory of decision is not at all clear. Indeed, the court seemed utterly
unable to make up its mind as to whether the duty violated arose from
a "contract" to insure or from an "undertaking" to perform.
Here there was simply a gratuitous promise; and the defendant's
lapse seems to have been the purest of nonfeasance. To what extent,
then, did the bailment of the furniture to the defendant change mat-
ters? Although this bailment was no doubt a crucial factor in the court's
decision, theoretically it is hard to see how it really could have changed
matters at all. In Carr v. Maine Central Railroad,"' it is true, the bail-
ment had been regarded as the first step in performance, taking the
15 Note i z supra.
" 78 N.H. 5oz, io2 Ad. 532 (1917).
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transaction out of the field of nonfeasance and embarking the defend-
ant on a course of active conduct from which it could withdraw only
by the exercise of care. But there the bailment was made as a necessary
and contemplated move under the promise and as a first step in its ful-
fillment. In the furniture case, however, the promise was not made
until after the bailnent was already arranged for, having absolutely
nothing to do with the bailment itself-and it is hard, indeed, to see how
that case involved anything but pure nonfeasance. For there was really
no undertaking or entering upon performance of the type which would
constitute feasance or active conduct and which would thus enable the
court to find a duty by implication in the absence of a binding con-
tract-at least, not as a step necessary to the fulfillment of the promise
to insure.
Nevertheless, the Siegel case appears in some ways to be one of mis-
feasance involving an implied duty of care. And there is language in
Crane's opinion to some extent justifying this interpretation. For he
says: "But if in connection with taking the goods McGrath [defend-
ant's agent] also voluntarily undertook to procure insurance for the
plaintiff's benefit, the promise was part of the whole transaction and
was linked up with the gratuitous bailment."" This language would
have given stronger support to the tort theory based on misfeasance if
the italicized part had read: ". . . the bailment was part of the whole
transaction and was linked up with the gratuitous promise." But the
two readings of this clause seem more or less convertible. And Crane's
following sentence lends additional support to the tort theory, bearing
in mind that both the bailment and the promise were gratuitous. There
he said: "The bailee, if such a contract were within McGrath's agency,
was then under as much of an obligation to procure insurance as he was
to take care of the goods.""'
In my opinion, however, the decision in this furniture case cannot
easily be reconciled with the Coggs v. Bernard theory of tort liability.
In order to bring such a case within the category of action or feasance
-the entering upon performance-I believe that the bailment must be
the first step necessarily contemplated in fulfillment of what had been
promised or undertaken and not just a casual occurrence incidental
thereto. Here the bailment had absolutely nothing to do with the
promise to insure and could not possibly be regarded as the first step
in its performance. This gratuitous bailment could imply in the way of
17 Siegel v. Spear, 234 N.Y. 479, 482, 138 N.E. 414, 415 (1923).
1R Ibid.
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duty of care only an obligation on the part of the defendant, once he
had accepted the goods, to take ordinary care of them such as keeping
them locked up and protected from the weather or from such hazards
as he might negligently have created to harm them.
Actually the court itself appears somewhat uneasily to have felt much
as I do about this matter, for it seems to have gone ahead and recog-
nized consideration sufficient to make a binding contract of the
promise to insure. Thus, it found the duty of care in that contract and
not implicit in the fact that defendant had engaged in feasance-had
actually entered upon the perforirance of a gratuitous promise. It is
important to note, however, that the court did not infer consideration
from any detriment to the plaintiff, for his non-exercise of the right to
insure was not bargained for by the defendant. In a way, this seems to
have been a plain case of promissory estoppel in the sense of Section
90 of the Contracts Restatement.19 Plaintiff had changed his position
in reliance on the defendant's promise; and when he was damaged as
a result of nonperformance, the court proceeded as if there were con-
sideration and gave the promise the effect of a binding contract from
which it inferred a duty of care. As Crane, J., observed: "We are in-
clined to think that if the contract were made-and we must assume
it was as there is evidence to sustain the findings of the jury to this
effect-there was in the nature of the case a consideration sufficient to
sustain the promise."20
If this interpretation of Siegel v. Spear is correct, then the fact, and
relative occurrence in time, of the bailment became matters of indif-
ference. Indeed, the apparent theory of the decision would even allow
a recovery in Thorne v. Deas,2 were that case to arise again. As to
this, Crane, J., observed: "I find that Thorne v. Deas (supra) has been
seldom cited upon this question of consideration and whether or not
we would feel bound to follow it to-day must be left open until the
question comes properly before us."' 22 Nevertheless, I cannot help
19 Rest., Contracts § go (1932).
2 0 To make sure that everyone concerned is completely at sea, note the following pas-
sage about Siegel v. Spear in i Williston, Contracts § 138 (rev. ed., 1936): "The promise
was enforced on the basis that it was made at the time of the bailment and the possession
of the goods was thereafter surrendered. There is no element of consideration in the
case, in view of the fact that the bailment was gratuitous and the promise to insure
was actually made just after the bailment had been agreed upon; there is simply reliance
upon the undertaking of the bailee." The quotation from Crane's opinion, above,
appears in Siegel v. Spear, 234 N.Y. 479, 481-2, 138 N.E. 414, 415 (1923).
21 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (S. Ct., 18o9).
2 2 Siegel v. Spear, 234 N.Y. 479, 484, 138 N.E. 414, 416 (1923). Note, however, that
Crane had already observed the following on pages 482-3: "When McGrath stated
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thinking that the rationale of the Siegel case is far from clear. In the
first place it seems to be an action sounding in tort, with recovery
based on the defendant's neglect to insure-a nonfeasance-where the
duty of care was found to arise in a binding contract supported by
consideration of a sort. And I just don't believe that the court would
have gone this far if there had been no bailment in the case.
Suppose the plaintiff had kept the furniture in his own apartment
and, after asking the defendant's advice about getting insurance, had
been told by the defendant to go ahead with his vacation-that he
would take care of the insurance gratuitously. Had defendant neg-
lected to perform this promise on which the plaintiff relied, and had
taken no step to carry it out, would the court really hold him liable if
the apartment house burned up and the furniture was destroyed? If it
would, then the theory of promissory estoppel would be completely
vindicated and Thorne v. Deas would no longer be law. But I will be-
lieve that New York has gone that far only when I see a square deci-
sion to that effect. In the meantime the actual circumstances of the
Siegel case render its decision inconclusive. While the bailment could
hardly be regarded as the first step in the performance of the gratui-
tous promise to insure-because the promise, when made and accepted,
did not have any necessary connection with the bailment-neverthe-
less it was an important psychological factor in the case. Thus, it may
be said to have played a part roughly analogous to impact in the fright
and mental anguish cases. 23 While this observation may seem far-
fetched, yet I can extract nothing more precise from the court's lan-
guage in the Seigel case.
III
In most of the situations where defendant is under no initial duty of
care to act, there is no bailment involved to clarify (or confuse) the
issue. Most of these situations arise in connection with hurt people or
with children (and even grown-ups) who are in a position of peril,
under circumstances where the defendants were not responsible for
that he would insure the furniture it was still in the plaintiff's possession. It was after
his statements and promises that the plaintiff sent the furniture to the storehouse.... It
is in this particular that this case differs from Thorne v. Dear (4 Johns. 84, 99) so much
relied upon by the defendant.... He [the plaintiff in Thorne v. Deas] gave up possession
of none of his property to [the defendant] .... The case would have been decided
differently, no doubt, if he had."
28 Reference is made to the old rule that the consequences of mental disturbance
negligently created were not actionable without incidental impact. See Holmes, C.J,
in Homans v. Boston Elevated Railway, 18o Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) •
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their plight but were in a position to save them from serious harm.
These cases are generally lumped under the category of moral obliga-
tion to render assistance, in implied recognition that there is no legal
duty to do so. And this holds true even where the defendant has non-
negligently, or without initial duty to avoid negligence, been instru-
mental in creating the plight of the plaintiff. Thus, most of these cases
occur in railroading, where trespassers are unwittingly hurt on the
tracks.
Under the so-called humanitarian doctrine, at least one state court24
places railroads under a duty of care to avoid harm initially to unseen
trespassers in helpless peril on the tracks, and this precedent has been
mentioned as an analogy bearing on the matter under discussion. But
surely it has nothing to do with this matter and constitutes only a
judicial vagary confusing the common-law duty of care owed by
landowners, as qualified by the doctrine of last clear chance. We are
fairly entitled to confine our inquiry here to the situation where the
railroad's servants discover that someone has been hurt on the right of
way without the fault of the railroad. What must they do? Clearly
they cannot proceed with the train while the hurt person is still hang-
ing from the front of the engine or is lying on or so closely to the
tracks that he would be further endangered by continued progress of
the train. Hence-if the railroad is going to continue to function-its
servants may simply place the hurt person to one side without incur-
ring liability of any sort. Arguably such a course would be the first
step in feasance-an item of conduct involving the railroad in a duty to
go further and remove the hurt person to a hospital. But no such case
appears to have been litigated.
Usually the crew takes charge of the hurt person, rendering first aid
and undertaking to get him to a hospital or to place him in the hands
of his family or friends, under a doctor's care. While the railroad crew
is not obliged to do this, simply embarking upon such course of con-
duct compels the railroad to see it through prudently. Subsequent
neglect of any sort raises a jury issue of negligence with respect to
further damage, even when any other course might interfere with the
crew's discharge of its duties in performing the railroad's business.
Thus, there is no duty in such cases to do anything, but if anything is
done, which involves taking the hurt person in charge, then it must be
24 For a citation of cases and discussion, see Becker, The Humanitarian Doctrine,
12 Mo. L. Rev. 395 (1947) and 13 Mo. L. Rev. 374 (1948).
44 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
done carefully."" The very act of charity puts a noose around the neck
of the kind-hearted person, from which he can escape only by per-
suading a court and jury that he proceeded without reproach.
It is hard to say how far courts will push this notion in recognizing
a duty of care, short of the defendant's actually taking the hurt per-
son in charge so that nobody else could render him assistance. Suppose
a motorist perceives a hurt person lying beside the road and, without
touching him, says to him that he will fetch him aid. If he drives off
and dismisses the whole matter from his mind, how can he be held
liable? Would it make any difference if he drove to a garage, tele-
phoned a couple of doctors' numbers, and then impatiently dropped
the whole matter because their lines were busy? He had entered upon
the performance of his promise; but would any court hold him to have
assumed a duty of care? Yet if the hurt person told the next passer-by
not to bother with getting help because assistance was on its way,
something like promissory estoppel as a source of duty of care might
be pressed against the original offeror of assistance. He might even
have gotten a doctor or hospital on the 'phone and carelessly given in-
correct instructions for reaching the hurt person. Would this be such
an entering upon or undertaking as to create a duty of care sufficient
to hale him before a jury? Or suppose he actually got an ambulance
and then could not recall exactly where the patient was. Indeed, sup-
pose while he was on his way to secure help, he negligently ran his
car off the road or into somebody else's car. If a court and jury might
review all such instances as possible actionable negligence, merely be-
cause the defendant had by his "undertaking" passed out of the area of
nonfeasance and into that of feasance, thus placing himself under a
duty to see it through, the denial of charity would be at a premium.
Perhaps courts should never recognize a duty of care in these cases
unless the defendant actually takes the hurt person in charge and, by
so doing, forecloses the possibility of another granting assistance more
effectively. And the same should probably be true in all situations
where one gratuitously undertakes to render aid to another. Surely
one who tries to rescue a drowning person should not be held account-
able simply because a court and jury think he might have done better.
If he does get him on land and then undertakes to resuscitate and care
for him, there might be some reason to hold that the rescuer had
assumed a duty of care. But most courts would not hold that a rescuer
25 See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 6. See also Yazoo & M. Ry. v. Leflar, 168 Miss. 25s,
50 So. 2o (1933) and Fitzgerald v. C. & O. Ry., i i6 W.Va. 239, 18o S.E. 766 (1935).
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had violated a duty of care against himself when he plunges into the
path of danger negligently created by a third person and thus bar his
recovery of damages because of his contributory negligence.26 Simi-
larly they should not place a rescuer under a duty of care toward the
rescued person unless it clearly appears that he has taken such person
in his exclusive charge and thereafter neglects to use ordinary care
under the circumstances.
There are several instances of employees taken sick at their places
of work, where the employers are not obliged to help them but never-
theless undertake to do so and thereafter behave in a questionable
fashion.2 1 In one case an employee became ill with a bad headache.
Her employer sent her home in a car. As the driver neared her home,
lie encountered a pool of water in the road through which he was
reluctant to drive. Hence he asked the employee to go the rest of the
way alone, on foot, which she did. She was overcome when she
reached her home and died. The New Hampshire court held that its
voluntary undertaking placed the employer under a duty of care to-
ward the deceased and that it would be for the jury to decide whether
or not there was negligence. 28 Similarly, when an employee is hurt at
his work, his employer may not be under a duty to care for him, but
if the employer's nurse is offered to render treatment, then there is a
duty of care that such treatment be reasonable and not negligent.29
A close analogy is perceived when business visitors are taken sick or
are non-negligently hurt in stores, theaters and amusement parks. It is
doubtful whether the enterprise is under any duty to render assistance
to the person in trouble; but if it does, then it is held to a duty of care
in doing so. A failure to do anything at all is apparently not a breach
of duty in such situations, at least when the calamity to the suffering
person has nothing to do with any activity occurring on the land.
Thus, a patron of a bathing beach run for profit fell on some steps and
was badly shaken up, although his fall was not due to the negligence of
the proprietor. He requested aid from the attendant, who put him off
while he waited on others; and when the patron was seriously hurt in
a desperate effort to help himself, the court refused to recognize that
there had been any duty of care, let alone a breach of it by the de-
26 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
2 7 See 12 A.L.R. 9o9 (19,1) and 46 A.L.R. 389 (1927). See also Bohlen, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 312 for a different view prevailing with respect to seamen.
2STullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 8z N.H. 268, 133 Atl. 4 (1926).
29 Vesel v. Jardine Mining Co., i1o Mont. 82, Yoo P. 2d 75 (94o). See also Baker v.
Adkins, 278 S.W. ,7z (Tex. Civ. App., 19:5).
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fendant's neglect."0 On the other hand, where a child falls on an esca-
lator and gets his fingers caught in the "comb," several courts have
recognized a duty on the part of the proprietor to use care in stopping
the escalator and in extricating the child from further harm, even
though they concede the absence of negligence in the original mis-
hap.3 1 In the leading case of Btcb v. Amory, however, the New
Hampshire court held that there is none but a moral duty on the part
of an enterpriser to avoid harm to a young known trespasser from the
continued operation of stationary machines in a manufacturing plant..2-
While such a decision makes sense if the situation is simply nonfeas-
ance, such a characterization appears to be strained. This seems more
like a landowner's duty of care to avoid harm through active conduct
toward a known trespasser. Perhaps there is a distinction between a
train moving over rails and a revolving buzz saw which.is screwed to
the floor; but they both seem like active conduct and should be treated
as such.
One class of enterprisers-public carriers-appear to be under some
sort of duty of care toward patrons who become ill on their premises.
although even here they may usually escape liability under the shelter-
ing category of nonfeasance. 3 But recognition of a fairly broad duty
to act in these situations seems apparent, because they already have the
unfortunate patron in charge, under circumstances where he could
not possibly secure other adequate assistance. After all, the passenger-
carrier relationship rests on a rather special contractual basis. Certainly
it is easy to understand those carrier cases involving drunks and others
who are able to walk but are not in condition to take care of them-
selves. When conductors help such people off trains and other vehicles
they must go farther and see them to a safe place, because of the mani-
fold dangers of traffic. Carriers may also get rid of obnoxious drunks;
but in putting them off, they assume a duty to see them clear of the
dangers associated with public carriage.84
3 0 Plutner v. Silver Associates, Inc., 61 N.Y.S. 2d 594 (N.Y. Munic. Ct., 1946). See
also Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall, 52 Ariz. 322, 80 P. 2d 952 (1938).
31 Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 34 N.E. 2d 177 (Ind. App., 1941), remanded in al 9 Ind.
348, 38 N.E. 2d 577 (1942), and superseded in 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E. 2d 334 (1942),
4 N.E. 2d 356 (1942); Connelly v. Kaufman & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A. 2d 125 (1944).
Compare Takashi Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores, 139 P. 2d 25, 6o Cal. App. 2d 177,
140 P. 2d 467 (1943).32 Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 At. 809 (1898).
33 Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 6, at 308-9.
34 Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Marr's Adm'x, ji9 Ky. 9S4, 85 SAV. 188 (1905).
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IV
One of the best known cases in this general field is Depue v. Fla-
tau. 3 There the plaintiff drove up to the defendants' farm on a cold
winter's evening, ostensibly to buy furs and cattle but also with the
idea of getting himself invited for supper and, perhaps, for the night.
Apparently the defendants did not like the plaintiff. They gave him
supper; but when he proposed spending the night, they turned him
down. Insisting that he be on his way, the son of the house helped him
into his fur coat and started him for the door and his sleigh. The plain-
tiff seemed unwell because he stumbled and partially fainted. Never-
theless, the son of the house put him into his sleigh, placed the reins in
his hands and started the horses off in the right direction. Next morn-
ing plaintiff was found on the road where he had fallen out of the
sleigh, having sustained severe injury from freezing. The defendants
claimed that they were under no duty to house the plaintiff or to take
care of him; but the Minnesota court held that they were under a duty
to behave far differently from the way in which they did. First it
talked about the moral duty to aid persons in distress. Then it brought
out and relied upon Brett's famous dictum in Heaven v. Pender,6 a
principle which even Brett himself later denied when he had become
Lord Esher. 7 That dictum read as follows: "... Whenever one person
is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another
that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recog-
nize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct
with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to
the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care
and skill to avoid such danger." If this counsel of perfection means
that anyone who happens upon another in distress is bound to help
him, then it is completely fallacious. It certainly cannot be taken to
create a legal duty of care where only a moral duty has existed before.
Nevertheless, this proposition has functioned as a sort of ideal in
stimulating the growth of duty of care required by manufacturers to
ultimate consumers and other members of the public not in privity of
contract with them.s At the same time, of course, that development
35 ioo Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907).
86 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883).
37 Le Lievre v. Gould, [18931 Q.B. 491, 497.
38 See Cardozo's reference to Brett's dictum in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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rests primarily on contract with someone who, in turn, brings the de-
fective chattel nearer the consumer or injured person; and it is based
essentially on the idea that a manufacturer is engaged in a profitable
business relationship with the public rather than being in pursuit of
merely gratuitous undertakings.
I have never seen anyone suggest that Brett's dictum be used to
place on a gratuitous donor or bailor the affirmative duty of inspecting
the chattel involved in order to discover and correct or disclose a
latent defect in it, even though the courts seem ruthless about enforc-
ing a duty to disclose known defects in such cases. While the absence
of pecuniary gain relieves the gratuitous conferrer of a benefit from
having to make an inspection to discover defects, for some curious
reason it does not relieve him from the burden of opening his mouth to
relate the existence of a known but unapparent defect. Perhaps this
reason is plain common decency towards one's fellow man, although
there is a legalistic analogy to setting a trap if such known defect is
not disclosed, which suggests the unrealistic but not uncommon notion
of an implied intent to harm. At any rate, that analogy seems less
astonishing than Chief Justice Holt's suggestion of "deceipt" in the
negligent performance of a gratuitously undertaken act for another,
and this observation, in turn, invites speculation on whether the true
explanation cannot be found in the theory of Coggs v. Bernard. Thus,
tile gratuitous bailor does not have to lend his car; but if he does, he
must do so carefully-an acknowledged duty which he violates if he
fails to warn of known latent defects and which he does not violate if
he simply lends the car for what is it, as far as he knows.
Here I must digress to comment on the sentimentality exhibited over
the duty of care owed by the owner of premises to business and social
visitors. It seems natural for courts to place an affirmative obligation
of care on landowners to keep their premises in safe condition for
visitors who make a limited entrance on premises for business pur-
poses. And to me it seems natural for the same courts to treat purely
social visitors quite differently. If I am willing to put up with my
house as it is, I should expect my friends to do likewise or to refrain
from coming. Naturally, I should expect short shrift if I know of some
latent danger on my premises and do not warn my guests about it. But
I think the courts should confine the duty of care toward social guests
to instances of what I shamelessly call "gross negligence." Even in
cases of known but undisclosed latent defects, I would not subject a
householder to the risk of facing a jury unless the trial judge were
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satisfied that the evidence indicated what I would call gross negligence.
Many state legislatures have shown in the host-guest statutes a similar
feeling about the active conduct of driving. 9 There seems more
reason to suppose that the same idea should apply to the nondisclosure
of latent but minor known defects in automobiles, where such a nondis-
closure could not reasonably be construed as gross negligence. Surely
the same is true of homes. So many cars and homes have something
wrong with them; and until the time when everybody carries properly
adjusted liability insurance, imposition of a broader duty of care on the
average citizen seems unduly harsh. 40
Anyhow, the Minnesota Court in Depue v. Flatau failed to make a
convincing case under either Brett's dictum or a moral-legal duty of
care. Certainly, its analogy to the railroad case of Marr's Administra-
trix4' did not sustain this latter theory. There a railroad was held un-
der a duty of care toward a drunken passenger whom its servants
helped from a train and put on a station platform, whence he roamed
in the dark as a trespasser into the railroad yard and was non-negli-
gently killed by a switching engine. That decision is acceptable either
because of the railroad's unusually great contractual duty of care to-
ward passengers or because its servants had undertaken to see the
drunk to a point of safety and had performed this undertaking inade-
quately by not removing him from the railroad's premises. The Minne-
sota court's recognition of a duty of care in the Depue case seems jus-
tifiable only because of the physical undertaking or entering upon the
act of seeing the plaintiff into his sleigh and on the road to his home.
Having gone that far, the defendants should have acted prudently un-
der the circumstances. For instance, they might actually have driven
the plaintiff all the way home.
It is certainly annoying to be told that either social or business
guests, by collapsing on your doorstep or in your parlor, can thus
legally compel you either to take care of them or to see them safely to
some appropriate refuge. But in all common sense, what else can be
done about situations of this sort? Suppose P is visiting you and be-
comes unconscious on your sofa, through no fault of yours. Presum-
ably, you may leave him there and do nothing about it, no matter how
much this course of inaction would worsen his ultimate condition. But
39 E.g., Smith-Hurd I1. Ann. Stat., c. 95 S 58a (195o).
40 See the various observations of the contributors in Laube v. Stevenson: A Dis-
cussion, 25 Conn. Bar J. iz 3 (1951).
41 Note 34 supra.
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who would behave in this fashion? You would either put him to bed
and call a doctor or have him removed to his home or to a hospital.
Although if you did nothing you have probably violated no legal duty
of care, that would not be true if he came to enough to get on his feet
and you shunted him out onto the public sidewalk where you left him
to his own devices. Such conduct would probably be regarded as mis-
feasance in violation of an implied duty of care. Suppose someone col-
lapsed on the floor of a store and thus became an interference to the
continuance of business. No doubt the storekeeper could ignore him
with impunity (although what storekeeper would?); but if he wished
to get rid of this nuisance, any method he adopted would probably
involve him in a duty to take prudent steps under the circumstances.
Another line of cases fits more naturally into the old rule of Coggs
v. Bernard. These are the landlord-tenant cases, an example of which
is Gill v. Middleton.42 There a landlord had leased a house to the plain-
tiff's husband and had not agreed to maintain the premises in good
condition. The floor of the privy became unsafe to step on, and the
tenant requested the landlord to fix it. Although he was not obliged to
do so, the landlord did undertake to repair the floor of the privy, and
after he had worked on it, he assured the plaintiff that it was all right.
When she used the privy, in reliance on the landlord's repairs, the
floor gave way and she fell into the vault, sustaining injuries. The
Massachusetts court, acknowledging that the landlord was under no
obligation to make the repairs or even to comply with his gratuitous
executory promise to do so, held that when he nonetheless chose to
fulfill his promise, he must be held to the standard of care ordinarily
employed by mechanics and under a duty to live up to such a standard.
While there is some sort of local confusion about ordinary and gross
negligence in these cases in Massachusetts, the court in Gill v. Middle-
ton thought that this landlord's conduct was tantamount to either type
of negligence, perhaps because of his assurance to the plaintiff that the
floor was made safe.43
There are other kinds of informal situations which afford trouble in
the field under discussion.4 Thus, suppose a railroad, having no statu-
42 1o5 Mass. 477 (1870). For cases in general, see i5o A.L.R. 1373 (1944).
48 See the extremely interesting discussion in Bohlen, Landlord and Tenant, in
Studies in The Law of Torts 202 (1926).
44 A few miscellaneous examples of cases which there is not room enough here to
discuss are: Thomas v. Studio Amusements, Inc., 5o Cal. App. 2d 538, T23 P. 2d 552
(1942); Roadman v. Johnson Motor Sales, zo Minn. 59, 297 N.W. 166 (1941); Sult v.
Scandrett, i i Mont. 570, 178 P. 2d 405 (1947); Brunelle v. Nashua Building & Loan
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tory duty to do so, establishes a watchman at a public crossing and
subsequently discontinues this service without notifying the public. A
motorist who is thereafter hit by a train at the crossing, not having
stopped because the watchman was not there, can build a good case
for recognition and breach of a duty to maintain a watchman. Here is
a kind of estoppel, analogous to the promissory estoppel employed in
Siegel v. Spear.45 Having undertaken to supply this special service, the
railroad must continue its performance or else notify cross-traffic that
it has been discontinued. This theory would not work with transients
who did not know that there ever had been a watchman at the cross-
ing. Estoppel would benefit only those who had been lulled into a
sense of security by a pre-knowledge of the fact that the watchman
had once been provided. Hence, it is hard to accept that part of Erie
Railroad v. Ste-wart4' which places the railroad under a duty of care
to have notified all motorists struck at the crossing, whether or not
they had known that the watchman had once been provided.
This extension of the case might possibly be justified under the
theory of Coggs v. Bernard. That is, the defendant railroad, not orig-
inally required to maintain a watchman at the crossing, nevertheless
did voluntarily inaugurate this service and performed it negligently by
not keeping the watchmen there after having started to do so. But that
would seem like an absurd application of a perfectly good theory. It
would more properly be applied where the flagman was present and
negligently waved the out-of-state motorist over the crossing as a
train approached.
In a somewhat more troublesome case, the owner of a car took it to
a garage to have repaired a known defect in the steering wheel.4 7 The
defendant garage returned the car to its owner with the assurance that
the repair was made. Actually, as it later transpired, no work at all had
been done on the car, the garage proprietor having honestly but care-
lessly thought it was fixed. The car owner thereupon set off upon a
trip with the plaintiff as his companion, and because of the defect the
Ass'n, 95 N.H. 391, 64 A. 2d 315 (j949); Green v. Murray Rosenberg, Inc., 50 N.Y.S.
ad 868 (S. Ct., Trial Term, N.Y. County, 1944) aff'd in 795 N.Y. 584, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 2o 5(S. Ct., App. Div.,ist Dep't, 1945); Doster v. Binghampton Gas Works, 95 N.Y.S.
2d 437 (Broome County Ct., 1950); Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa.
426, 13 A. ad 34 (1940); Therrien v. First Nat. Stores, 63 R.I. 44, 6 A. ad 731 (1939);
Nelson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 252 Wis. 585, 32 N.W. ad 340 (1948).
45 Note 12 supra.
46 4o F. 2d 855 (C.A. 6th, 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 843 (1930), with which compare
Suit v. Scandrett, i 19 Mont. 570, 178 P. ad 405 (1947).
47 Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927).
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car left the road, causing harm to the plaintiff. Here the Washington
Supreme Court declared that no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff
by the garage. That court had already accepted the rule of MacPher-
son v. Buick Co.,48 and the plaintiff contended that the substitution of
the word "repairer" for "manufacturer" should operate under that
doctrine to imply a duty of care by the garage toward people like the
plaintiff, who would foreseeably be hurt if the repairing had been neg-
ligently done. With this argument the court wholeheartedly agreed,
but it denied that the garage defendant was even a repairer. "It did
nothing upon the automobile. It only agreed to repair and did not do
it." Then the court proceeded to declare: "Had the respondent under-
taken to repair the steering gear and had negligently done the work, a
different question would be presented....
Here the defendant had had the auto in his possession as a bailee for
repair and had stated that it 'was repaired. Of course, this case does not
really fit into the context of this article because the car did not belong
to the plaintiff, no promise had been made to him, and the defendant
had not gratuitously promised to fix the car. He was operating for
profit and gain and this was a regular business transaction with the
owner of the car. But I should have supposed-as long as the court
itself raised the point of undertaking and entering upon performance
as the source of duty to the plaintiff-that when the garage took the
c-ar into its hands, it had passed beyond the area of nonfeasance and
into the ambit of feasance, or actual undertaking. Certainly there was
a kind of estoppel effected, even in favor of the plaintiff; for the car
owner, who had known of the defect, might very well have warned
the plaintiff of it if he had known that the repair had not been made.
Even if there was a plausible excuse for denying recovery to the plain-
tiff here under the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Co., which seems
doubtful, there appeared to be ample evidence on which to ground an
undertaking and, hence, an implied duty of care toward the plaintiff
on the theory of Coggs v. Bernard.
What would the Washington court have done with a case like Gill
vL. iddleton,5" supposing that the landlord did not actually repair the
floor of the privy but nevertheless assured his tenant's wife that he
had done so and that she might thereafter safely use it, which she did,
to her damage? Or suppose that the garage proprietor had told the car
4s 217 N.Y. 382, i1 N.E. Io5o (916).
49 Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 556, "5S Pac. 939, 942 (1927).
50 ioS Mass. 477 (870).
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owner that he would fix the steering gear gratuitously, took the car
into his garage, did nothing on it at all, and then returned it with the
assurance that it was repaired, in reliance on which the owner himself
used the car and was hurt. While we might all agree that complete
non-action in these situations would involve the defendants in no
breaches of duty, even after gratuitous verbal undertakings or prom-
ises, yet what did happen, together with the assurance that the repairs
had been made, should place these defendants under duties of care to-
ward the plaintiffs who relied and were hurt. The undertaking or en-
tering upon sufficient to take a case out of the area of nonfeasance and
bring it under the category of feasance, thus giving rise to a duty of
care, probably should be inferable as a matter of common sense from
attendant circumstances. And such an undertaking might well be in-
ferred from behavior which is plainly nonfeasance, as long as the de-
fendant thereafter deliberately creates a sort of estoppel by lulling the
plaintiff into a sense of security with purely verbal assurances that the
requested change has been made. In other words, it seems plain that
there are situations where words alone, spoken in the absence of any
obligation to speak them, might qualify as undertakings or acts quite
sufficient to justify the implication of a duty of care, as long as such
words are not promissory but are representational in character, wheth-
er or not they are innocently or negligently made. Certainly such in-
stances would more closely resemble Chief Justice Holt's "deceipt" in
Coggs v. Bernard than did the defendant's actual physical conduct in
that case.
V
The foregoing account reveals the source of duty of care in a vari-
ety of situations. It is difficult to find any common thread running
through these various patterns. But they all suggest a gratuitous un-
dertaking, either in words or in conduct, by which a defendant relates
himself to a plaintiff in such a way that the latter is lulled into a sense
of dependence and false security. Our common law has always placed
great emphasis on possible pecuniary benefit to the defendant as a
criterion in determining whether or not he is under a duty of care. If
his negligent omission or nonfeasance has occurred as part of an entire
transaction originally founded on a business venture involving gain,
then our courts are more willing to recognize a duty to avoid such
negligence by omission or nonfeasance. On the other hand, if the
whole transaction is in the nature of a gratuitous undertaking, then
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they tend to deny the presence of duty unless the defendant has en-
gaged in some active conduct in relation to the plaintiff's interest.
Aside from a possible development based on the idea of promissory
estoppel, this trend seems fairly uniform.
But it is still quite difficult to determine just when an onission,
which is concededly nonfeasance, is allowed to retain that characteris-
tic in order to support the conclusion of "no duty" or, on the other
hand, borrows color from preceding items of active conduct so as to
become merely a part of a whole transaction of activity, thus support-
ing the conclusion of "duty of care" and its breach. An interesting
example of this subtle problem occurred in Pease v. Sinclair Oil Co.51
There the defendant oil company circularized science teachers in
schools and colleges, offering them gratuitously small and compact
exhibits of highly refined petroleum products. The plaintiff, a high
school chemistry teacher, wrote and procured one of these exhibits
for his class. It arrived by express and consisted of small jars of color-
less liquid labeled "gasoline," "benzine," "kerosene," etc. Some months
after the exhibit had been put up in the school laboratory, the plain-
tiff procured a chunk of metallic sodium which he planned to use ex-
perimentally in tiny pieces. Pure sodium oxidizes rapidly and must be
protected from even the moisture in the air. A tiny piece on water
bursts into flame. It is usually kept in oil to prevent oxidization. Need-
ing some kerosene in which to store the sodium, the plaintiff opened
the bottle from the defendant's exhibit marked "kerosene" and poured
it over the sodium which he had placed in a glass jar. A violent explo-
sion occurred, causing the plaintiff serious injuries. Then it transpired
that several of the bottles in defendant's exhibit including that marked
"kerosene" contained distilled water, and the defendant's explanation
was that most absolutely pure petroleum products looked just like
water anyway, and that the exhibit was much safer to ship when
the bottles contained water instead of inflammatory liquids. No word
of this substitution, however, was communicated to the plaintiff or to
any other recipient by the defendant.
Was there a duty of care in this case on the part of the defendant
and, if so, was there negligence amounting to a breach of such duty?
The only reprehensible part of this whole transaction was the de-
fendant's failure to warn the plaintiff of the substitution of water for
the inflammable liquids in the exhibit. That failure, of course, was
pure nonfeasance. But it was merely an item in a course of conduct
51 iO4 F. 2d 183 (CA. 2d, 1939).
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initiated and carried through by the defendant, and, as such, took
color from the preceding circumstances becoming a part of such con-
duct or feasance rather than retaining in isolation the characteristics of
nonfeasance. How do we know this? As far as I can tell, only because
the court so concluded when it took the position that the defendant
had gone so far in a course of conduct that its failure to go further was
more like launching an instrument of potential harm rather than like
merely refusing to become an instrument of good.5" Of course, the
court noted that this gift exhibit was essentially an advertising scheme
and, as such, introduced a possible element of pecuniary gain into the
transaction. But this makeweight probably had little to do with the
decision. The crux of the matter lay in the fact that the defendant
knew its exhibit would end up in a science laboratory where the con-
tents of the bottles might conceivably be used for what they pur-
ported to be. It was this realization, coupled with the knowledge that
water-a harmless enough item in most contexts-might prove to be
harmful when used as a different chemical substance, that influenced
the court, especially since it would have been so easy for the defendant
to put the teacher "in the know." In spite of the defendant's sincere
motive of achieving safety in shipping the exhibit, the whole transac-
tion smacked of a kind of estoppel and of a sort of "deceipt," if we
may again borrow Chief justice Holt's word from Coggs v. Bernard.
As a matter of common sense, therefore, the court simply concluded
that the defendant had gratuitously set in motion a series of acts which
properly exposed its behavior to the scrutiny of a jury.
Now we gain nothing by kidding ourselves that we have achieved
anything like a principle of universal and infallible application in this
development from Coggs v. Bernard. For whether or not the courts
will use this principle to find a duty of care will always depend upon
the circumstances. In spite of elements like reliance and estoppel, un-
dertaking and entering upon, exclusive assertion of protective interest
over the plaintiff, and the like, there are still inarticulate considerations
of policy which upset the accurate and satisfactory operation of that
principle. And the best illustration I can find to support my disillusion-
ment concerning this principle is the typical water company case.
A private water company secures a franchise from a city. As a con-
dition to securing a monopoly, it contracts with the city to install
water hydrants at specified places and to maintain pressure in such
52 Quoting Cardozo in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., z47 N.Y. i6o, 159 N.E.
896 (1928).
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hydrants sufficient to extinguish fires. In return for this service, the
city agrees to pay the water company somewhere between $i z.oo and
$50.oo per year per hydrant-an amount barely sufficient to provide
for their upkeep. Then a building of one of the citizens, the plaintiff,
catches on fire and is burned to the ground because there is no pres-
sure in the hydrants. Here the plaintiff sues the water company for
loss of the building due to its negligence and, except in three states, is
given a very cold reception by the courts."
The plaintiff in this type of case usually has three strings to his bow.
He asserts a right to recovery under statutes in most states requiring
public utilities to render adequate service to all citizens. The courts
declare that such statutes mean only that the service must be offered
and sales of water be made in due course, on a non-discriminating
basis. He asserts a right as a third party beneficiary of the contract
between the city and the water company, looking to the contract as
the source of a duty of care owed to him. Almost uniformly the courts
say that it was never intended in the contract between the city and
water company to set up any rights in private citizens, at least with
regard to fire hydrants, which could be converted into duties of care
to avoid loss by fire through insufficient pressure. In addition, he
asserts a common-law duty of care on the part of the water company
to each property owner purportedly protected against fire by the
hydrants. And it is here that the principle we have pursued through-
out this essay falls so ignominiously to the ground.
In one of the leading cases of this type, Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co.,54 the plaintiff sought recognition of this common-law duty
of care through the theory underlying MacPherson v. Buick Co. It
noted that defendant's enterprise, at least insofar as it affected the
installation and maintenance of hydrants, was contractual in its incep-
tion and it relied on the foreseeability of dependence and use by third
parties like itself to bridge the gap of absence of privity of contract.
While the plaintiff might well have proceeded directly on the theory
of Coggs v. Bernard, stressing the fact that the water company was
holding out its hydrant service to the public, had exclusively taken
over this enterprise in that locality, had built up a sense of reliance on
the part of the citizens which might operate as an estoppel, had actual-
ly entered upon performance of this undertaking in direct physical
relationship to the property holdings in the community, and had done
53See 6z A.L.R. 1199 (1929).
5 4 z47 N.Y. i6o, i 5 9 N.E. 896 (9z8).
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all this carelessly, it chose the more circuitous route. But Cardozo in
his opinion rapidly brought the crux of the matter down to this Coggs
v. Bernard approach. As a matter of fact, he made it quite plain that
his conception of MacPherson v. Buick Co. was the issue of duty to
avoid harm by nonfeasance or omission in the context of previous con-
duct involved in a fairly special relationship. He pointed out that the
duty of care undertaken by a manufacturer toward the ultimate con-
sumer came from its having embarked upon the enterprise to make
and sell for profit-a course of conduct which, when begun, acquired
sufficient impetus to comprise as a part of such undertaking any omis-
sions such as neglect to discover by inspection and to correct latent
defects. Thus he makes the application of the MacPherson v. Buick
Co. rule a veritable function of the doctrine of Coggs v. Bernard,
recognizing that nonfeasance as such cannot give rise to a duty of care
in the absence of rather special relational factors.
Applying himself to the water company case in hand, Cardozo soars
off into the ethereal sphere of cryptic verbalism in a most unsatisfac-
tory manner. "The hand once set to a task may not always be with-
drawn with impunity though liability would fail if it had never been
applied at all," he says, suggesting that "time-honored," but "incom-
plete" and "at times misleading" formula comprising the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance. "The query," he goes on to
say, "always is whether the putative [or supposed] wrongdoer has
advanced to such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of
harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become an
instrument for good." Somewhat querulously he remarked: "The
plaintiff would have us hold that the defendant, when once it entered
upon the performance of its contract with the city, was brought into
such a relation with every one who might potentially be benefited
through the supply of water at the hydrants as to give to negligent
performance, without reasonable notice of a refusal to continue, the
quality of a tort."'5
Then, in a manner befitting Abinger at his stuffiest in Winterbottom
v. Wright,5" Cardozo deprecates the extension of liability to the point
that would logically make a water company responsible for a holo-
caust laying an entire city low. And if this step could not be taken,
55 The first of these three quotations appears in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,
247 N.Y. i6o, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928); the other two appear ibid., at 168 and 898.
56 io M. & W. jo9 (1842). Thus Cardozo said at page 168 and 898 of Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., note 55 supra: "We are satisfied that liability would be unduly
and indeed indefinitely extended by this enlargement of the zone of duty."
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then his court could not take the first step of letting merely the plaintiff
recover. "The law does not spread its protection so far." 51 Thus Car-
dozo pays lip service to legal principles which he had done so much to
mold into their modern form, while at the same time he produces a
sense of frustration in the classroom with his facile manipulation of
common law and his argument in terrorem to achieve a result opposite
to that indicated by the rules themselves. For most students-and, I
daresay, most professors, as well-start out with the feeling that a
water company does not have to engage in the undertaking of supply-
ing water through pipes and hydrants which they install, but if it does
enter upon such a course of action, particularly in close physical juxta-
position to the property interests of citizens and where by its exclu-
sive position it induces a sense of reliance on their part, then it should
be placed under a duty to see this undertaking through with care. In
light of plain inferences from the situations discussed above in this
article, it seems absurd to suppose that the water company had not set
its hand to the task of supplying pressure in the hydrants so that its
failure to go through with its undertaking becomes mere "inaction...
at most a refusal to become an instrument for good," thus saving it
from a duty of care to go further. Such manipulation of legal doctrine
suggests that the god has clay feet and that the common lawv is a pretty
poor thing.
But this sort of treatment by Cardozo should immediately put the
wary student on his guard. Cardozo knew what he was doing in the
11ocb case and his underlying reasons are soundly in keeping with
modern trends in tort law. At the same time his opinion is misleading,
since he did not plainly reveal why he reached his decision. Here he
suggests the high priest who is dealing with the mystic formulas of a
theology which the neophytes are trying to comprehend. Someday
they will understand what goes on, and why, as they draw nearer to
the inner circle. in the meantime, it would be unfortunate to let it
appear that the principles of the law are not infallible. When the re-
positories of social wisdom intuitively realize that the strict application
of these principles would produce an undesirable result, they must
manipulate the principles so it appears that they either lead to-or, at
least, do not forbid-the desirable result. Thus are the principles them-
selves maintained and, at the same time, is justice achieved. And this is
particularly true when the presiding mentor has an axe to grind, inso-
57 Cardozo quoting from Holmes' bpinion in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
275 U.S. 303 (1927).
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far as the prevailing principles in their modem form are largely of
his making.
Perhaps I am too rough on Cardozo, although I think not. For he
did throw out a couple of broad hints in the Moch opinion. He spoke
of "the crushing burden that the obligation would impose," and ob-
served: "A promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind the
assumption of a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward." ' This
latter remark had to do with the $42.50 per hydrant per annum which
the city paid the water company. And if these hints do not reveal the
reasons for the New York Court's decision in the Moch case, then
reference to some of the older water company cases from other juris-
dictions should make it plain, as I shall soon indicate.
The real reason for the decision in the Aoch case seems to be that
fire insurance companies, and not water companies, are the appropriate
social institutions for bearing losses by fire under these circumstances.
Practically all property owners today carry fire insurance. They pay
plenty for the protection they get and the insurance companies are
professional risk-bearers, well able to shoulder the losses which occur.
Indeed, losses by fire should be left finally on them unless there is some
good reason for allowing them to shift the burden elsewhere. Now,
suppose a fire insurance company carries the risk on a house which is
burned to the ground by sparks negligently emitted by a passing rail-
road engine. Here it pays the loss to the house owner and is subro-
gated to the latter's action in tort against the railroad. The railroad is
managed to administer the risk of losses by fires which it negligently
sets on adjacent property; and there is no good reason why it should
not pay for this loss. Since the house owner cannot recover twice-
once against the insurance company and once against the railroad-and
since, as between these two companies, the railroad is clearly in the
wrong, then it seems equitable to leave the ultimate loss on its shoul-
ders. While this line of reasoning may seem to apply equally well to
the water company cases under discussion, a moment's reflection may
indicate otherwise.
Certainly Cardozo realized that a decision for the Moch Company
was tantamount to a decision for Moch's fire insurance underwriter
against the water company. Any right acknowledged to Moch would
be equitably assigned by subrogation to its fire insurance carrier-and
would quickly be asserted. But what could the water company do
about administering this risk? It always received $42.50 per hydrant
M8 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 47 N.Y.,i6o, 165-6, 159 N.E. 896, 897-8 (1928).
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per annum, regardless of the nature of the property holdings near any
particular hydrant or of the changes which took place in the neigh-
borhoods. That left it virtually nothing to fund against the contin-
gency of loss which might be indirectly occasioned through an inad-
vertent failure of the water pressure. Take a hypothetical residential
or factory area served by one hydrant. The total fire insurance prem-
iums paid to cover the buildings represented from the risk of fire
would be a fairly substantial sum, depending upon their value. Car-
dozo thought the sum of $42.50 insufficient to warrant the conclusion
that a negligent water company should be made to relieve a fire insur-
ance company from bearing the ultimate risk of loss by fire; and he
knew that that is what would happen in a subrogation action if the
water company were held liable to the property owner for negligence
in not maintaining the pressure at the hydrant. Of course,, that would
not be so where the property owner had neglected to take out fire
insurance. But you could hardly have one law for imprudent property
owners and another for their more prudent neighbors. Moreover, al-
most all property owners carry fire insurance nowadays as a matter
of routine. Certainly if the duty of care of a water company were
established in an action brought by an uninsured property owner, it
would seem impossible not to recognize the same duty of care when
an insured home was burned; and any right there recognized would
automatically pass to the insurer by subrogation when it had paid
the loss.
The distinction between allowing the home owner to recover
against the spark-throwing railroad and denying his recovery against
the pressure-deficient water company is rather subtle, but perhaps
possible to maintain. After all, the railroad company did cause the fire
by its negligent operation in the first place, whereas the water com-
pany had absolutely nothing to do with causing the fire. This rather
shabby recourse to the difference between nonfeasance and misfeas-
ance may seem unsatisfactory; but no doubt it had a good deal to do
with Cardozo's thinking in the Moch case. For the railroad was a risk
creator and the water company was not.
Even less clear, however, is the distinction between these water
company cases and those where the pressure on the hydrants is ample,
but, because of the negligent acts of outsiders, the water cannot be
used to extinguish the fires. Thus, when the fire hose is stretched across
tracks from the hydrant to the fire and is needlessly severed by a pass-
ing train or trolley car,59 or where a building contractor had negligent-
59 Metallic Compression-Casting Co. v. Fitchburg Ry. Co., 1o9 Mass. 277 (1872).
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ly driven piles through and had shattered the water main,"0 the prop-
erty owner is allowed to recover against the outsider whose interfer-
ence made it impossible to use the water pressure. And it makes no dif-
ference that the property owner is insured, his insurance company
being subrogated to his rights after paying him off."' Here an even
shabbier recourse to the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeas-
ance is invoked. The railroad and the building contractor in these
cases did not create the risk of fire. They only acted negligently to
prevent the conferring of a benefit that otherwise would have been
bestowed.
It is extremely hard to reconcile most of the water company cases
with recognized legal principles, particularly as there are three juris-
dictions in which the property owner may recover against the water
company because of low pressure in the hydrant. 2 And in two of
these his fire insurance company is subrogated to his right of action. 3
But these three jurisdictions do not agree among themselves on the
proper theory underlying liability; and for a while they had the U.S.
Supreme Court guessing on this subject. 4 At the theoretical level any
desired result seems possible, depending upon how you read and apply
the available principles. Florida follows the third party beneficiary
rule, using the contract as a source of duty of care to permit recovery
in tort.65 North Carolina, on the other hand, seems to lean toward the
theory of Coggs v. Bernard, a course which temporarily won the
approval of the U.S. Supreme Court in 19o6.6 But while Kentucky
also allows the property owner to recover, it stoutly maintains that
such recovery is for breach of contract and is not in tort.67 Now if
recovery is allowed at all, it would presumably have to be in tort, for
it is hard to see how the contract obligation toward the third party
beneficiary could do more than provide the source of duty of care on
which to found a negligence action. The U.S. Supreme Court seemed
clearly to concede this in its review of the North Carolina court's
judgment. 8 But the Kentucky court nevertheless insisted that the
recovery was not in tort, its sole reason apparently being to allow
60 Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co., 167 Wis. 541, j68 N.W. i99 (1918).
61 Ibid.
62 Florida, Kentucky and North Carolina. See 6z A.L.R. 199 (i9z9) for cases.68 Florida and North Carolina.
64 Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, zoo U.S. 57 (19o6).
65 Florida Public Utilities Co. v. Wester, i5o Fla. 378, 7 So. Ad 788 (1942).
66 Note 64 supra.
67 Burford & Co. v. Glasgow Water Co., 223 Ky. 54, 2 S.W. zd 1027 (1928).
68 Note 64 supra.
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recovery by the property owner but to prevent his fire insurance com-
pany from becoming subrogated to his right of action against the
water company! "If the water company had willfully or negligently
set fire to the property, it would have been guilty of a tort, and it then
could be said that in paying the loss the insurance companies were dis-
charging an obligation, which, in equity and good conscience, should
have been discharged by the water company."" But such was not the
case, it said, the liability of the water company being "predicated sole-
ly on the breach of its contract to furnish sufficient facilities to extin-
guish the fire," while the insurance companies, in paying up, did not
discharge any obligation of the water company but only their own
contractual undertakings.
Trhe most striking of all these water company cases, however, are
those in the majority rule jurisdictions where even the cities which
have directly contracted with the water companies are denied recovery
for loss by fire of public buildings.," Because of the direct contract
privity on which to found duty of care, it would seem almost impos-
sible to deny liability there; yet that is exactly what happened. And
these decisions emphasize the fact that no amount of legal principles
will be permitted to stand in the way of the desired result. Such a vari-
ety of positions by the courts make the general principles of the com-
nion law seem rather ridiculous. But some of the cases in which recov-
ery is denied clearly reveal the true rationale underlying the majority
rule. Stated simply, it is a determination to place the loss of these fires
right on the shoulders of fire insurance companies-and nothing more.
This determination, obliquely shared even by the minority view state
of Kentucky is so strong that the majority view states will not let an
uninsured property owner recover from the negligent water company,
even if it is the contracting city itself. For these courts seem convinced
that property owners should carry fire insurance and deserve no sym-
pathy if they fail to do so. Presumably most fires are started acci-
dentally or through the fault of the property owner himself-at least
not by financially responsible third party tortfeasers. Since the handy
and relatively cheap device of fire insurance is available, the courts
seem bent on compelling all property owners, including contracting
municipalities themselves, to depend only on fire insurance for pro-
tection against the risk of low pressure in fire hydrants.
69 Burford & Co. v. Glasgow Water Co., 223 Ky. 54, 57, 2 SAV.. d 1027, ioz8 (1928).
70 Alilford v. Bangor Ry. & Elec.'Co., io6 Me. 3 16, 76 At. 696 (19o9); Ukiah v.
Ukiah Water & Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173, 75 Pac. 773 (1904).
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The Kentucky compromise may seem preferable to this seemingly
harsh rule. In that state an uninsured property owner may recover
against the water company, and if he has only partial insurance, he is
permitted such recovery to the extent that he is not insured, in addition
to his insurance money, and all recourse through subrogation is denied
the insurance company.7 But this compromise might be deemed unac-
ceptable in most states because of the somewhat fantastic rationalization
necessary to support it-that the liability of the water company is not in
tort but in contract, thus leaving no claim in tort to which the insurance
company can be subrogated. As indicated above, the U.S. Supreme
Court clearly held that if the water company is held liable to the prop-
erty owner, it is a liability in the nature of tort and not contract. 12
True enough, the only issue before that court was whether the judg-
ment of the North Carolina court in favor of the property owner quali-
fied as a judgment in tort under a statute giving precedence to such
judgments over first mortgage liens. Nevertheless, this conclusion seems
so obvious that the Kentucky compromise, even if it correctly states
that subrogation occurs only where liability in tort exists, can hardly
win general acceptance.
The opinions of the courts applying the majority rule indicate that
their basic operating premise is a belief that the loss in these cases should
be borne only by fire insurance companies. In the Maine case,73 where
the city sued for loss of its town hall by fire, the court referred to the
familiar rule of Hadley v. Raxendale and gave the whole rationale of its
decision in the following sentence: "It certainly cannot be reasonably
claimed that for the moderate consideration received by a water com-
pany under such a contract as the one actually made in the case at bar,
it was within the contemplation of both parties that the water company
had undertaken to make good the loss which would result from the de-
struction of the plaintiff's property by fire."174 And that was where
there was contract privity between the parties! Compare Cardozo's
argument in the Moch case, that the water company "will not be
deemed to have had in mind the assumption of a risk so overwhelming
for any trivial reward. 75
The clearest statement of this position, however, appears in the
71 Note 67 supra.
7
.
2 Note 64 supra.
73 Milford v. Bangor Ry. & Elec. Co., io6 Me. 316, 76 Ad. 696 (19o9).
,4 Ibid., at 3.5 and 699.
76 Note 58 supra.
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Ancrum decision of the South Carolina court.76 That court first sug-
gests the general purposes for contracts of this sort as being "to pro-
mote the prosperity of the city... by lessening the risk of destruction
of property by fire, by lowering the rate of insurance, increasing the
general sense of security and, therefore, the general happiness, diminish-
ing the risk of numbers of persons being thrown out of employment,
and generally in giving steadiness and confidence to the life and enter-
prises of the city." All these are legitimate public ends, for which "the
city has the right to pay out public funds." But it doubts "whether [the
city] has the right to apply public funds to the larger compensation
which a water company of necessity must charge for the enormous
peril of having to pay for all private property lost by its negligence,"
an expenditure of public funds which would discriminate in favor of
those with property in peril and against those otherwise situated. And
it went on to say: "In addition to this, if it is considered, as is held in
some jurisdictions, that the action for loss in cases like this is an action
of tort, then for their fire losses the insurance companies would be sub-
rogated to the rights of the owner of the property and entitled to re-
cover from the water company.... That a water company assuming
such liabilities would have to demand very large compensation to have
any profit or even to save itself from bankruptcy is most obvious." It
concluded that the contract between the city and the water company
"is naturally to be referred to the purpose of the city to promote the
general municipal welfare... rather than to indemnify individual
property owners from fire loss; the compensation to be paid is fifty
dollars each for seventeen hydrants-a sum on its face utterly inade-
quate to meet the expenses of furnishing the water and to afford com-
pensation for the enormous risk the plaintiff insists was assumed. '77
70 Ancruni v. Camden Water, L. & I. Co., 82 S.C. 284, 64 S.E. 151 (1909).
77 Ibid., at 295-7 and 155-6. Compare the language of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Atlas Finishing Co. v. Hackensack Water Co., io N.J. Misc. 1197, 163 Ad. 2o
(S. Ct., 1932), where recovery was denied on a contract theory, on the'theory of
Coggs v. Bernard and on the basis of the violation of a statute. There the court said,
in part on page 22: "That no liability-for failure to furnish fire protection could have
been contemplated from such a situation [public service price setting] is obvious. It is
even more apparent when we consider the enormous liability which the water company
would be compelled to assume, under plaintiff's theory of implied obligation without
any adequate, and, it may be said, any consideration at all, commensurate with the
hazard involved. Under the requirements of the Public Utility Act .... the defendant
water company, was required to supply water to all indiscriminately within the
field of its operations, and at uniform rates presumably based upon water supplied
as a commodity or as merchandise. Therefore the defendant would be obliged to
supply water to premises involving all degrees of fire hazard at the same uniform
rates, thus assuming liability, practically as an insurer, for millions of dollars worth
of property, upon which, either from the nature of the business or the locality in
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The Kentucky court,78 allowing recovery by the property owner
against the water company but denying subrogation to the fire insur-
ance company, observed: "Here the fire was not caused by a tort on the
part of the water company. The most that can be said is that the loss
might have been averted if the water company had complied with its
contract. Therefore the case is one where it is sought to make the
water company liable, not merely to a citizen and property owner who
was not a party to the contract, but to a third person with whom such
citizen and property owner had contracted for insurance against fire."
And remarking that subrogation is a rule of equity designed to achieve
justice, it declared that its application here would defeat justice. Then,
observing that "property owners generally carry fire insurance," it
said: 'But, if it once be held that insurance companies are subrogated
to the property owner's right of action against the water company,
there will be every inducement for the insurance companies to sue the
water company in the hope that they may obtain a recovery. The water
company is entitled to live and to make a fair return on the investment.
To meet the increased liability, higher water rates will be necessary.
The added burden will fall on the consumers. The result will be that
the citizens and property owners will not only pay for fire protection
premiums sufficient to cover the risk assumed, but will also pay higher
water rates for the purpose of relieving the insurance companies of the
liability which they have been paid to assume. In our opinion this will
operate oppressively on the people, and will run counter to a sound
public policy.""9 And to clinch this line of thought the U.S. Supreme
Court 0 remarked of the city's undertaking to contract with the water
company: "It bought the citizen no new right of action, and did not
bargain to secure for him an indemnity against loss by fire, but left him
to protect himself against that hazard by insurance, paying the premium
directly to an insurance company instead of indirectly through taxa-
tion." And it also noted that a contrary intention would have allowed
for greater compensation to the water company in amounts fluctuating
with the variation of risk from year to year, instead of the same small
amount indefinitely, also deprecating "the use of public money to
secure a private benefit to the owner of private property."8'
which the property is situated, no insurance company would think of assuming the
risk, and allof this by implication only."
78 Note 67 supra.
79 Burford v. Glasgow Water Co., 223 Ky. 54, 56, 57-8, 2 S.W. 2d 1027, 1029 (1928).
80 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220 (1912).
81 Ibid., at 232, 233.
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The foregoing account seems amply to justify my explanation for
Cardozo's cryptic handling of the Moch case. I have had students sug-
gest, however, that a development more consistent with the extension
of liability in general would have led to recovery against these water
companies with the idea of compelling them to administer the risk of
loss occasioned by low pressure in hydrants through liability insurance.
That would no doubt be in accordance with developments toward en-
terprise liability stemming out of MacPherson v. Buick Co. and with
the general trend toward absolute liability without fault."' For the gen-
eral extension of tort liability in modern times is occurring mainly
where the inadvertence or conduct of some enterpriser-some defect in
his product or some mischance in his active undertakings-has alone
created the risk of harm and the subsequent damage, under circum-
stances where only the enterpriser is in a practicable position to ad-
minister the consequences of risks he creates either through self-
insurance or liability insurance made possible by slightly increased
prices. Consumers as a rule cannot practicably carry insurance against
such contingencies. The trend in our law now seems to be away from
leaving the consequences of chance harm on individuals and toward
placing the burden on society through the institution of liability insur-
ance. For insurance companies can easily spread the absorption of such
chance harms over all society.
But the situation in these water company cases is quite different. First
of all, the only interest involved is property, usually real property; and
the risk is invariably fire, against which most individuals have long been
taking out insurance as a matter of routine. Second, the risk of fire is
not created or initiated in any way by the negligent water companies
but is only aggravated by the failures of pressure at the hydrants. While
I believe this to be a poor distinction, yet the existence of fire.indemnity
insurance as an established and popularly used agency for administering
and absorbing these losses obviates the social need for pursuing the
matter any further. This works no undue hardship on fire insurance
companies, for they never have any trouble in becoming subrogated
against third party tortfeasers who have started the fires. Furthermore,
as indicated above, in view of the prevalence of private recourse to fire
insurance, it would be a questionable use of municipal tax funds to pay
additional amounts to water companies so that they might purchase
liability insurance. I assume that they could not be held liable without
providing them with some financial aid to cushion them against this
82 See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359
(1951), with special reference to numerous citations.
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liability. Then, of course, most of us believe that property owners who
do not protect themselves with fire insurance are guilty of a type of
contributory negligence. So, if the risk of loss is already socialized
through private fire insurance contracts, why not leave it right there
instead of trying to shift it to some other pigeon-hole of this modem
institution of community loss absorption?
This discussion must be disillusioning to first year law students who
expect to stake their professional futures on the principles of the com-
mon law. They must wonder why Cardozo did not come clean and say
in the Moch case just why the theory of Coggs v. Bernard was so in-
adequate when it seemed at first to offer the right answer? Perhaps he
felt that there still remains enough usefulness for legal principles to jus-
tify their unsullied retention at a high theoretical level. Or perhaps, as
is more likely, he knew that the lawyer who has his eyes open and can
see what is going on around him, will use legal principles only as a
framework for his career-something to give him direction-and will
never cease looking for wisdom in the everyday facts of life all around
him. For the wise lawyer must learn that social policy in the law cannot
be reduced to a formula, any more than can life itself.
VI
What can a student salvage from this study of the inception of duty
of care under a variety of informal circumstances? Basically he can pro-
ceed on the assumption that, in the absence of any promise to act or of
any duty to act inherent in statute or some relationship between the
parties, one is not under a duty of care to aid or assist another or to un-
dertake anything in his behalf. At the same time he can safely assume
that if one does, by his conduct, undertake to do something for another
in a way that relates him directly to the interest of that other, such as
taking it in his exclusive possession or charge or in a way that induces
dependence or reliance on his action, then there is a duty to act care-
fully. As far as gratuitous promises are concerned, however, there is no
duty to carry them through unless he has compromised himself by some
act closely associated with the other's interest involved, in such a way
as to invoke reliance of the other in the nature of an estoppel on him-
self. How far this notion will extend in the absence of such a closely
related act, however, depends upon how far courts are willing to carry
the modem concept of promissory estoppel in recognizing something
akin to consideration for the purpose of making the promise a binding
contract and thus a source of duty. But within this framework of gen-
eralities the student must beware of pitfalls. For when these generalities
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arc tied in with othcr developments in the field of duty of care, such as
those involving "the assault upon the citadel of privity"881 like Mac-
Pberson v. Buick Company, they may or may not prove useful and
accurate. And whether or not they do depends upon basic policies that
underlie the direction of our modem law of negligence and are, as yet,
almost completely inarticulate in the opinions of judges.
The student of today must be aware of the power of judges to
manipulate perfectly good legal doctrine at will and to recognize that
such judicial license is all a part of the traditional common-law process.
He must expect a steady trend in favor of shifting loss from the shoul-
ders of individuals to the back of the community as a whole, through
the coffers of enterprise or through the pockets of insurance companies,
knowing all the time that they in turn spread this loss throughout soci-
ety-for somebody must pay in the final analysis, and that somebody is
always the collective individuals comprising the community as a whole.
But he must become used to the idea that "duty" is a concept which
may be used not only to extend this trend but also to reverse it-ap-
parently as courts see fit. Thus, in Waube v. Warrington84 he may per-
ceive a most arbitrary exploitation of the duty concept to relieve liabil-
ity insurance companies from a slight burden they certainly should be
made to bear. There, in spite of a steady trend toward extension of
liability for the foreseeable consequences of fright induced by tortious
conduct, the Wisconsin court refused to hold liable for the death of
plaintiff's wife a motorist who had negligently run down and killed her
small child in the street, the sight of which caused the death by shock
of the mother as she stood in a position of personal safety from collision
in her yard.
Then, of course, there are the water company cases. But these are
easily reconciled with the prevailing drift toward socialization of loss;
and they serve amply as the exception which more than proves the rule.
In light of all the confusion in this essay, how can I better end it than
by quoting Chief Justice Holt's gracious benediction to Coggs v.
Bernard, the very case that started all this trouble in the first place? "I
have said thus much in this case, because it is of great consequence, that
the law should be settled in this point, but I don't know whether I may
have settled it, or may not rather have unsettled it. But however that
happen, I have stirred these points, which wiser heads in time may
settle.118 5
88 Cardozo, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 25 N.Y. 170, 18o, 174 N.E. 44i, 445 (193£).
84 z6 Wis. 603, z58 N.W. 497 (1935).
8 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 920 (1703).
